After four years of (almost) continuous work, I have finally completed my book:
Madness and the Demand for Recognition: A Philosophical Inquiry into Identity and Mental Health Activism.
You can find the book at the Oxford University Press website and at Amazon.com. A preview with the table of contents, foreword, preface, and introduction is here.
Madness is a complex and contested term. Through time and across cultures it has acquired many formulations: for some, madness is synonymous with unreason and violence, for others with creativity and subversion, elsewhere it is associated with spirits and spirituality. Among the different formulations, there is one in particular that has taken hold so deeply and systematically that it has become the default view in many communities around the world: the idea that madness is a disorder of the mind.
Contemporary developments in mental health activism pose a radical challenge to psychiatric and societal understandings of madness. Mad Pride and mad-positive activism reject the language of mental ‘illness’ and ‘disorder’, reclaim the term ‘mad’, and reverse its negative connotations. Activists seek cultural change in the way madness is viewed, and demand recognition of madness as grounds for identity. But can madness constitute such grounds? Is it possible to reconcile delusions, passivity phenomena, and the discontinuity of self often seen in mental health conditions with the requirements for identity formation presupposed by the theory of recognition? How should society respond?
Guided by these questions, this book is the first comprehensive philosophical examination of the claims and demands of Mad activism. Locating itself in the philosophy of psychiatry, Mad studies, and activist literatures, the book develops a rich theoretical framework for understanding, justifying, and responding to Mad activism’s demand for recognition.
My chapter published online at Oxford Handbooks.
Will appear in print in the Oxford Handbook for Psychiatric Ethics Volume 1 next year.
Islamic Perspectives on Psychiatric Ethics explores the implications for psychiatric practice of key metaphysical, psychological, and ethical facets of the Islamic tradition. It examines: (1) the nature of suffering and the ways in which psychological maladies and mental disorder are bound up with the individual’s moral and spiritual trajectory. (2) The emphasis placed on social harmony and the formation of a moral community over personal autonomy. (3) The sources of normative judgements in Islam and the principles whereby ethical/legal rulings are derived from the Qur’an and the Prophetic Traditions. Finally, the perspective of the chapter as a whole is employed to present an Islamic view on a number of conditions, practices, and interventions of interest to psychiatric ethics.
Click HERE for Pre-Production version
Ethical practice in psychiatry is underpinned by a secular, anthropocentric concept of autonomy. While this reflects the cultural heritage of the communities where modern psychiatry was developed, it might not be suitable for populations with different understandings of autonomy. This presentation outlines some Islamic cultural/ethical issues of particular relevance to decision-making in psychiatry.
First, the scope of autonomy is considered. Outside one’s personal relation with God, autonomy is secondary to community. A collectivity can only achieve salvation when the conduct of each member is aligned with the norms of the faith. Moral/social violations are not individual choices but a threat to this order, and therefore of concern for others. Shared responsibility for the actions of others renders decision-making a collective enterprise guided by figures of authority. This has implications for informed consent, confidentiality, privacy, and the duty of clinicians towards patients.
Second, the paradox of agency is considered. Action in Islamic theology is both predetermined and the full responsibility of the agent. Suffering, in a determinist theodicy, is foreknown to God and is a trial and expiation for sins. This may promote fatalism towards treatment. With a free-will theodicy, humans bring suffering upon themselves through their actions, and must take an active attitude towards relieving it. Deterministic attitudes complicate the clinician’s duty to relieve suffering within the available means, and render sharing information (e.g. about prognosis) irrelevant. The presentation concludes by asking whether and to what extent a clinician should abandon her secular ethical principles in favour of other religious or cultural ones.
Intereseting blog on bioethics